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Abstract
This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications
of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model
with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main
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cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise
labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high cap-
ital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater
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aligned implying a conict of interests.
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1 Introduction
An important and ongoing issue for scal policy since the research of Edge-
worth (1897) relates to whether policy designed to increase e¢ ciency has a
negative e¤ect on the distribution of income (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980) and Stiglitz (1987)). Chamley (1986) showed, within a representative
agent context, that long-run optimal allocative e¢ ciency can be achieved by
imposing a zero tax on capital.1 This family of models, however, is naturally
silent on issues relating to inequality and whether there can be a conict of
interests between di¤erent agents. As Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 14)
point out, we need to construct models "that allow us to predict the e¤ects
of policy changes not just on aggregate variables (total wealth) but also on
the distribution". In a macroeconomic context, heterogeneous agent models
are obvious candidates.
A popular type of heterogeneity much employed in the literature on op-
timal taxation relies on the distinction between capitalistsand workers
(see e.g. Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999)). Using this breakdown in a neo-
classical growth model, Judd (1985) derived the striking result that a benev-
olent government under commitment should not impose any redistributive
capital taxes in the long-run. This holds even from the perspective of those
agents without capital income. Thus, there is no trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency
and equity.2 Although the robustness of this normative long-run result has
been challenged,3 it remains a point of reference in the modern theory of
optimal taxation. As Mankiw et al. (2009, p. 167) point out, "perhaps the
most predominant result from dynamic models of optimal taxation is that
the taxation of capital ought to be avoided".
The above results hold when the government can commit itself to future
policies. In recent work, within the representative agent framework, Klein
and Rios-Rull (2003), Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008) and Martin
(2010) have also examined time-consistent optimal scal policy. The general
message arising from this research is that Markov-perfect policy results in
1For reviews, see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, ch.
15).
2The trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity has attracted a lot of attention in the
literature on exogenous tax reforms in heterogeneous-agent set-ups (see e.g. Domeij and
Heathcote (2004), Garcia-Mila et al. (2010) and the work reviewed therein). These studies
generally conclude that there are important trade-o¤s between these two objectives, when
lifetime utility is considered. Also see Greulich and Marcet (2008) who directly address
the issue of Pareto improving optimal tax reforms, albeit in a Ramsey world.
3See e.g. Guo and Lansing (1999) for Ramsey taxation in a model with imperfect
competition and prots. See also Lansing (1999) who shows, for a special case of Judds
model, that the Ramsey tax policy is constant over time and thus time-consistent.
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ine¢ ciently high capital taxes in the long-run relative to Ramsey policy.
Martin (2010) further shows the circumstances under which the government
would have an incentive to conscate capital when both capital and labour
taxes are optimally chosen. Thus, assuming a single income tax seems to
confound the diverse roles of di¤erent tax instruments. Krusell (2002) shows
that, in a Judd-type model where a single production tax is used to nance
lump-sum transfers to workers, the time-consistent tax in the long-run is
generally non-zero and non-conscatory as long as some weight is put on the
utility of the capitalists.4
The above research, however, leaves a number of important questions
unanswered under this popular type of heterogeneity. For example, what is
the time-consistent optimal mix of capital and labour taxes and the associ-
ated optimal provision of public goods? Does the lack of commitment hurt
all agents in the economy? And if yes, are there any substitutes for commit-
ment? Can there be changes in the policy design that are Pareto improving?
Or, is it unavoidable to have a conict of interests between agents under
time-consistent policy, in contrast to Ramsey policy?
In an attempt to provide answers to the questions posed above, we study
the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending
policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. In our
model, the government chooses both capital and labour tax rates to nance
endogenous utility-enhancing public services. Thus, in contrast to the models
used by Krusell (2002) and Azzimonti et al. (2008), who also study time-
consistent policy and redistribution, we use a relatively rich menu of policy
instruments ruling out lump-sum ones. Following Krusell et al. (2002) and
Klein et al. (2008), we focus on the steady-state of Markov-perfect equilibria
working with di¤erentiable Generalized-Euler Equations (GEE) and using
their numerical perturbation algorithm for the computation of the steady-
state. Employing the case of a benevolent government as a benchmark, we
study the implications of partisan preferences on the part of the govern-
ment. As expected, the model reproduces Judds (1985) benchmark results
for optimal policy under commitment, i.e. a zero capital tax and a positive
labour tax are optimal for each agent in the long-run. However, our ndings
for long-run Markov policies under heterogeneity stand in stark contrast to
Ramsey policies.
We rst nd that, in the absence of commitment, it is optimal for a
benevolent government, which cares equally about all citizens, to tax capi-
tal heavily and to subsidise labour. In particular, this result complements
4Earlier work on time-consistent policy is reviewed in Krusell (2002) and Klein et al.
(2008).
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what we know from the representative agent models discussed above, i.e.
lack of commitment results in ine¢ ciently high capital taxation. It is also
suggestive of Martins (2010) result, that, since high future capital taxation
discourages labour e¤ort today, the government nds it optimal to subsidise
labour. However, Martin (2010) also nds that, for standard calibrations as
in Klein et al. (2008), it is optimal for the government to impose conscatory
capital taxes. In contrast, we show, for the same calibration used in Klein
et al. (2008), that a conscatory capital tax does not follow in a capitalist-
worker setup. Thus, heterogeneity in roles (capitalists versus workers) allows
us to obtain robust interior time-consistent policy solutions over a range of
empirically relevant parameters.5
A second key result of our analysis is that time-consistent optimal policies
critically depend on the weight that the government attaches to the welfare
of each agent, which is also consistent with the results in Krusell (2002). In
contrast to Ramsey policies (see e.g. Judd (1985) where the zero capital
taxation result holds irrespective of the weight given to capitalists vis-a-vis
workers), a government that cares disproportionately for one of the agents
will choose di¤erent policies. We show that, up to point, a partisan bias
towards capitalists on the part of the government works as a substitute for
the lack of commitment and this is benecial to both workers and capital-
ists. In particular, starting with Benthamite preferences, we nd that, as
the weight the government places on the workers utility increases, capital
taxation rises and labour taxation falls, until eventually conscatory capi-
tal taxation is invoked. This partisan bias towards workers hurts everybody
including workers. On the other hand, as the weight given to workers falls
below Benthamite preferences, labour subsidies turn into taxes, while cap-
ital taxation decreases. However, beyond a critical point, capital taxation
is required to increase to help nance the provision of the public good and
eventually conscatory capital taxation follows. The same analysis further
reveals that, up to a point, favouring the capitalist over the worker is Pareto
improving.
Finally, we show that capitalists and workersinterests regarding the op-
timal amount of "capitalist bias", which the government might employ, are
not aligned. For example, capitalistswelfare is maximised at a lower capital
and higher labour tax rate than for workers. This implies a conict of inter-
ests between the agents and hence a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity.
5Our results also complement Krusell (2002), who nds that in a model with a single
income tax and lump-sum transfers, a conscatory tax arises only when a non-Benthamite
government attaches a zero weight to capitalists. As we discuss below, the introduction
of labour taxation and the endogenous provision of public goods restricts the range of
weights for which an interior solution can be obtained for a non-Benthamite government.
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This arises under discretion since the fall in the capital tax, as a result of
the "capitalist bias", has additional benets for the capitalist in the form
of increased (after-tax) capital income. For the worker, the welfare price he
would have to pay, in terms of increased labour taxes, to have the capital tax
reduced to what is optimal for the capitalist, is too high. If the government
chooses what is best for the capitalist on e¢ ciency grounds, since aggregate
welfare is higher in this case, then the inequality between the worker and the
capitalist will increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
economy. Section 3 solves for Markov-perfect policy. Sections 4 and 5 report
results for the benevolent and partisan cases respectively. Section 6 concludes
the paper. An appendix includes technical details.
2 The economy
We next describe a deterministic version of the neoclassical growth model
comprised of capitalists, workers, rms and a government.6 Time is dis-
crete and innite. In each time-period, the government acts as a Stackelberg
leader, so that it moves rst choosing its current tax-spending policy and, in
turn, private agents move acting competitively. We solve this game by back-
ward induction by rst solving for the decentralized competitive equilibrium
(DCE), given policy. Then, taking this DCE into account, the government
chooses its tax-spending policy to maximize a weighted average of capitalists
and workerswelfare.
2.1 Economic agents and their roles
Capitalists consume, work and save in the form of capital. They also own
the rms and receive prots which, for simplicity, are zero in equilibrium.
Workers in contrast do not have access to capital markets and thus only
consume and work. The government taxes income from capital and labour
to nance utility-enhancing public spending.
6As in the related literature (see e.g. Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Krusell (2002)),
we take these roles as given and do not model their microfoundations. See e.g. Aghion
and Howitt (2008, ch. 6) for a review of the literature on participation in capital markets
and inequality.
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2.2 Population composition
Total population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , Nw < N
are identical workers, while the rest Nk = N  Nw are identical capitalists.
Workers are indexed by the subscript w = 1; 2; :::; Nw and capitalists by
the subscript k = 1; 2; :::; Nk. Private rms are indexed by the subscript
f = 1; 2; :::; N f . We assume that the number of rms equals the number of
capitalists, Nk = N f , or that each capitalist owns one rm.7
2.3 Households
2.3.1 Utility function
We start by presenting the two types of households, capitalists, k, and work-
ers, w. Each household h  k; w maximises:
Uh =
1P
t=0
tu
 
Ch;t; uh;t; G
c
t

(1)
where Ch;t is household hs consumption at t; uh;t is hs leisure at t; G
c
t is
average government services (i.e. total public consumption services divided
by total population, N) at t; and 0 <  < 1 is the time preference rate. The
period utility function u(:) is increasing and concave in all arguments.
2.3.2 Budget constraint and optimality conditions of capitalists
The within-period budget constraint of each capitalist (indexed by subscript
k) is:
Ck;t +Kk;t+1   (1  )Kk;t = rtKk;t + k;t 
  kt [(rt   )Kk;t + k;t] +
 
1   lt

wtlk;t (2)
where Kk;t+1 is the end-of-period capital stock held by each capitalist; rt is
the return to the beginning-of period capital stock; wt is the wage rate; lk;t
is hours of work by each capitalist; lk;t + uk;t = 1 is the time constraint in
each period; k;t is rmsprot per capitalist; 0   kt < 1 is the tax rate
on capital income8 and prots; 0   lt < 1 is the tax rate on labour income;
0 <  < 1 is the capital depreciation rate; and Kk;0 > 0 is given.
7As in the literature on optimal taxation, we take these population sizes as given and
do not allow ows between capitalists and workers.
8Following most of the literature on optimal policy, we assume capital taxes net of
depreciation. See e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Klein et al. (2008).
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Each capitalist k acts competitively choosing fCk;t; lk;t; Kk;t+1g1t=0. The
optimality conditions include the above budget constraint, as well as the
following Euler-equation and the labour supply condition:
@uk;t
@Ck;t
= 
@uk;t+1
@Ck;t+1

1 +
 
1   kt+1

(rt+1   )

(3)
@uk;t
@(1  lk;t) =
@uk;t
@Ck;t
 
1   lt

wt. (4)
2.3.3 Budget constraint and optimality conditions of workers
The budget constraint of each worker (indexed by subscript w) is:
Cw;t =
 
1   lt

wtlw;t. (5)
Each worker w acts competitively choosing Cw;t and lw;t in each period, where
as above lw;t + uw;t = 1. The optimality conditions of this static problem
include the above budget constraint and the labour supply condition:
@uw;t
@(1  lw;t) =
@uw;t
@Cw;t
 
1   lt

wt. (6)
2.4 Firms
Each rm f = 1; 2; :::; N f maximizes prots given by:
f;t = Yf;t   rtKf;t   wtlf;t (7)
where Yf;t is each rms output and Kf;t and lf;t are respectively the inputs
of capital and labour employed by the rm at each t: The output technology
is:
Yf;t = f(Kf;t; lf;t) (8)
where the production function f(:) is increasing and concave in both ar-
guments, and, for simplicity, displays constant returns to scale in the two
factors.
Each rm f acts competitively choosing Kf;t and lf;t to maximize prots.
The standard optimality conditions of this static problem are:
rt = fk(Kf;t; lf;t) (9)
wt = fl(Kf;t; lf;t) (10)
f;t = 0. (11)
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2.5 Government budget constraint
We assume that the budget is balanced in each period. Thus, in aggregate
terms, we have:
NG
c
t = N
k[ kt (rt   )Kk;t +  ltwtlk;t +  kt k;t] +Nw ltwtlw;t (12)
so that there are three policy instruments,  kt , 
l
t and G
c
t , out of which only
two can be independently set.
2.6 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE)
We now summarize the DCE for any feasible policy. In this equilibrium,
households maximize utility, rms maximize prots, the government budget
constraint is satised and markets clear.9 It is convenient to (i) dene the
population shares, nw  Nw=N and nk  Nk=N = 1 nw; and (ii) work with
net factor returns Rt 
 
1   kt

(rt   ) and Wt 
 
1   lt

wt. Then, the
DCE is summarized by the following six equations in six unknowns, which
are fCk;t; Cw;t; lk;t; lw;t; Kk;t+1g1t=0 and the path of one of the three policy
instruments:
@u(Ck;t; lk;t; G
c
t)
@Ck;t
= 
@u(Ck;t+1; lk;t+1; G
c
t+1)
@Ck;t+1
(1 +Rt+1) (13)
@u(Ck;t; lk;t; G
c
t)
@(1  lk;t) =
@u(Ck;t; lk;t; G
c
t)
@Ck;t
Wt (14)
@u(Cw;t; lw;t; G
c
t)
@(1  lw;t) =
@u(Cw;t; lw;t; G
c
t)
@Cw;t
Wt (15)
Cw;t = Wtlw;t (16)
nkYf;t = n
kCk;t + n
wCw;t + n
k[Kk;t+1   (1  )Kk;t] +Gct (17)
G
c
t = n
kYf;t   nkKk;t  RtnkKk;t  Wt(nklk;t + nwlw;t) (18)
where,
Yf;t = f

Kk;t; lk;t +
nw
nk
lw;t

: (19)
9The market-clearing conditions in the capital, labor, dividend and goods markets
are respectively NfKf;t = NkKk;t, Nf lwf;t = N
klk;t + N
wlw;t, Nff;t = Nkk;t and
NkCk;t +N
wCw;t +N
k(Kk;t+1   (1  )Kk;t) +NGct = NfYf;t.
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For what follows below, it is useful to note that if we combine the budget
constraint of workers (16), the economys resource constraint (17) and the
government budget constraint (18), capitalistsconsumption is:
Ck;t =  Kk;t+1 + (1 +Rt)Kk;t +Wtlk;t
 C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; lk;t; Kk;t+1) (20)
while, from (18) and (19), government consumption is written as:
G
c
t  G(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; lk;t; lw;t). (21)
Thus, equations (16), (20) and (21) are used into the three optimality
conditions (13)  (15) to substitute out respectively Cw;t, Ck;t; and Gct at any
t.
3 Markov-perfect policy
In each time-period, the government chooses all current policy instruments
to maximize a weighted average of capitalists and workers welfare subject to
the DCE conditions. The government chooses the tax policy instruments,
 lt and 
k
t ; or equivalently the associated net factor returns, Wt and Rt,
while public spending, G
c
t , follows residually from the a-temporal government
budget constraint.
To solve for time-consistent optimal policy, we work as follows. We,
rst, characterize the equilibrium responses of private agents. Among other
things, this will transform the governments optimization problem into a
recursive one, in the sense that policy choices a¤ect payo¤s dated t and
later but not earlier. We next solve the governments dynamic programming
problem. Finally, we dene the Markov-perfect equilibrium conditions and
the functional equations to be solved for.
3.1 Response of private agents
We start by characterizing the responses of capitalists and workers. Given the
assumed timing of agentsmoves within each period, private agentschoices
will be functions of the current value of the economys state variable, Kk;t;
and the current value of the independent policy instruments, Wt and Rt.
In particular, if a Markov-perfect equilibrium exists, equilibrium strate-
gies will be functions of the current value of the economys state variable,
Kk;t. Thus, as shown in subsection 3.3 below, a solution will include undeter-
mined functions of the form Kk;t+1 = h(Kk;t), lk;t = (Kk;t), lw;t = (Kk;t),
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Wt = (Kk;t) and Rt = 	(Kk;t). We can thus use h(Kk;t+1), (Kk;t+1),
(Kk;t+1), (Kk;t+1) and 	(Kk;t+1) to replace respectively Kk;t+2, lk;t+1,
lw;t+1, Wt+1 and Rt+1 on the right-hand side of capitalistsEuler-equation
(13). This makes the governments problem recursive. In turn, inspection of
the three behavioral optimality conditions (13)   (15), using (16), (20) and
(21), reveals that, in general, Kk;t+1 = H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt), lk;t = (Kk;t;Wt; Rt)
and lw;t = M(Kk;t;Wt; Rt), where the properties of the functions H(:), (:)
and M(:) follow from those in (13)-(18).10 These three functions show the
response of private agents given the economys state is Kk;t and the values of
the two independent policy instruments are Wt and Rt, under the presump-
tion that we will be in a Markov-perfect equilibrium in the future (see also
Klein et al., 2008, p. 795).
3.2 Dynamic programming problem of the government
The government chooses Wt and Rt to solve the recursive dynamic program-
ming problem:
V (Kk;t) = max[(1  )u(Ck;t; 1  lk;t; Gct) + (22)
+u(Cw;t; 1  lw;t; Gct) + V (Kk;t+1)]
where V (Kk;t) denotes the value function of the government at t; and ,
(1  ) are the weights attached by the government to the utility of workers
and capitalists respectively. Thus, when the government has a Benthamite
utility function,  = nw and (1  ) = nk. The maximisation is subject to
the recursive form of the DCE, namely:
Ck;t =  Kk;t+1 + (1 +Rt)Kk;t +Wtlk;t
 C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; lk;t; Kk;t+1) (23)
lk;t = (Kk;t;Wt; Rt) (24)
Kk;t+1 = H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt) (25)
Cw;t = Wtlw;t (26)
lw;t =M(Kk;t;Wt; Rt) (27)
G
c
t = n
kYf;t   nkKk;t  RtnkKk;t  Wt(nklk;t + nwlw;t)
 G(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; lk;t; lw;t) (28)
10To save space, the properties of these response functions will be specied below when
we adopt specic forms for the primitive functions to obtain a numerical solution. The
analytical expressions in implicit form are however available on request.
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where
Yf;t = f

Kk;t; lk;t +
nw
nk
lw;t

: (29)
3.2.1 Optimality conditions for policy instruments
The optimality conditions for Wt and Rt are respectively:
(1  )
"
@uk;t
@Ck;t
@Ck;t
@Wt
  @uk;t
@(1  lk;t)
@lk;t
@Wt
+
@uk;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Wt
#
+ (30)
+
"
@uw;t
@Cw;t
@Cw;t
@Wt
  @uw;t
@(1  lw;t)
@lw;t
@Wt
+
@uw;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Wt
#
+ 
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
Hw(t) = 0
(1  )
"
@uk;t
@Ck;t
@Ck;t
@Rt
  @uk;t
@(1  lk;t)
@lk;t
@Rt
+
@uk;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Rt
#
+ (31)
+
"
@uw;t
@Cw;t
@Cw;t
@Rt
  @uw;t
@(1  lw;t)
@lw;t
@Rt
+
@uw;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Rt
#
+ 
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
Hr(t) = 0.
where Hw and Hr denote the partials of the response function for Kk;t+1 with
respect to Wt and Rt.
3.2.2 Envelope condition
Given Wt and Rt, the envelope condition for the state variable, Kk;t, is:
dVt
dKk;t
= (1  )
"
@uk;t
@Ck;t
@Ck;t
@Kk;t
  @uk;t
@(1  lk;t)
@lk;t
@Kk;t
+
@uk;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Kk;t
#
+ (32)
+
"
@uw;t
@Cw;t
@Cw;t
@Kk;t
  @uw;t
@(1  lw;t)
@lw;t
@Kk;t
+
@uw;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Kk;t
#
+ 
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
Hk(t)
where Hk denotes the partial of the response function for Kk;t+1 with respect
to the state, Kk;t.
3.3 Markov-perfect equilibrium
We can now combine equilibrium conditions to solve for the unknown func-
tional equations Kk;t+1 = h(Kk;t), lk;t = (Kk;t), lw;t = (Kk;t), Wt =
(Kk;t), Rt = 	(Kk;t) and the governments value function, Vt = V (Kk;t).
To substitute out the latter, and working as in Klein et al. (2008), we use the
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optimality condition for Wt in (30) to obtain an expression for
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
and
its one period lead, dVt+2
dKk;t+2
. These two expressions are in turn substituted
into the lead once envelope condition (32) yielding the so-called Generalized
Euler-equation (GEE).
Thus, the nal system to solve consists of the governments GEE, the
governments optimality condition for Rt in (31), the Euler condition of cap-
italists in (13), the labour supply condition of capitalists in (14) and the
labour supply condition of workers in (15), i.e. there are ve equations in
ve functional equations, Kk;t+1 = h(Kk;t), lk;t = (Kk;t), lw;t = (Kk;t),
Wt = (Kk;t) and Rt = 	(Kk;t).
3.4 Quantitative assumptions
To quantitatively address the key questions raised in the Introduction, we em-
ploy the numerical perturbation algorithm proposed by Krusell et al. (2002)
and Klein et al. (2008) to solve the system of functional equations derived
above at the steady-state. To facilitate comparability with the literature,
we adopt the same functional forms for utility and production, as well as
the same common parameter values used in and Klein et al. (2008). In
particular, we use:
u
 
Ch;t; lh;t; G
c
t

= 1 log(Ch;t) + 2 log(1  lh;t) + 3 log(Gct) (33)
Yf;t = AK

f;tl
1 
f;t (34)
and A = 1,  = 0:36,  = 0:96,  = 0:08, 1 = 0:261, 2 = 0:609, 3 =
1   1   2. Since (33) applies to both capitalists and workers, the only
additional parameters required by our setup include nk and nw = 1   nk.
In our baseline parameterization, we set nk = 0:3. The Appendix derives in
detail the set of conditions dening the Markov-perfect equilibrium implied
by (33)  (34) ; and briey discusses the solution algorithm.11
4 Benthamite (benevolent) optimal policy
In this section, we study the case of a benevolent, or Benthamite, govern-
ment in the sense that the weights  and (1  ) attached by the govern-
11Although we employ logarithmic preferences and the government budget is balanced,
our remaining model assumptions (i.e. less than full capital depreciation, endogenous
labor, two distorting income taxes and endogenous public spending) imply a DCE where
current savings decisions do not depend only on current returns and taxes as in Lansing
(1999). Hence there is a genuine time-consistency problem. Also note that further details
regarding the solution algorithm can be found in the Appendix of Klein et al. (2008).
12
ment to the utility of workers and capitalists are their population shares,
i.e.  = nw and (1  ) = nk. Following the related literature, we also re-
port results for Ramsey policy and the associated social planners solution.
In the case of Ramsey second-best policy, the government chooses fWt, Rt,
G
c
tg1t=0 to maximise a weighted average of capitalists and workers welfare, as
specied in (22), subject to the DCE (13)  (19). The social planners rst-
best problem is dened as the case in which we choose allocations only, i.e.
fCk;t; Cw;t; lk;t; lw;t; Kk;t+1; Gctg1t=0, to maximize the same objective subject to
the resource constraints (17) and (19).
4.1 Social Planner versus Ramsey
To contextualise the e¤ects of lack of commitment on optimal scal policy,
we rst highlight the di¤erences between the social planners and Ramseys
allocations. Table 1 shows, as expected, that a Benthamite social planner
(SP) will nd it optimal to make all agents equal and this also maximises
aggregate e¢ ciency. On the contrary, a Ramsey government needs to take
into account the distortions introduced by the tax system and thus does
not nd it optimal to equate the welfare of both agents. Instead, it nds
it optimal to support aggregate welfare by nancing the public good in the
least distorting way. Then, consistent with the results in Judd (1985) and
the other related studies discussed in the Introduction, the optimal tax on
capital in the long-run is zero under Ramsey policy, while the labour tax rate
is positive.
As expected, aggregate welfare, private consumption of both agents, pub-
lic goods provision and aggregate output are all lower under Ramsey policy
than under the social planners allocation. Ceteris paribus, both lw and lk
are lower under Ramsey since the social planner, by internalising the public
good in his choices, nds it optimal to produce more output and provide
more public goods. Hence, he commands higher labour and capital inputs
relative to the decentralised choices. Notice that the capitalists labour sup-
ply is much lower under Ramsey since it is adversely a¤ected by the positive
labour tax rate, whereas the workers labour supply is inelastic with respect
to the labour tax since he does not save and has logarithmic preferences.
Thus, the implied rise in leisure time under Ramsey leads to greater welfare
than under the social planner for the capitalist, whereas the worker is worse
o¤ since the utility associated with his increase in leisure is not enough to
compensate for the fall in consumption and public goods provision.
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Table 1: Steady-state
SP Ramsey Markov
Y 2.1473 1.5046 1.0141
K=Y 2.9589 2.9589 1.1137
C=Y 0.5095 0.5095 0.7280
I=Y 0.2367 0.2367 0.0891
Gc=Y 0.2538 0.2538 0.1829
tk  0.0000 0.8287
tl  0.3965 -0.0650
Ck 1.0941 0.8964 0.7712
Cw 1.0941 0.7109 0.7242
G
c
t 0.5450 0.3819 0.1855
lk 0.3499 0.1174 0.2545
lw 0.3499 0.3000 0.3000
U -0.7885 -0.8417 -0.9748
Uk -0.7885 -0.7005 -0.9364
Uw -0.7885 -0.9022 -0.9912
4.2 Ramsey versus Markov policy
The results in Table 1 suggest that, under commitment, it is optimal to
minimise the e¢ ciency distortions of the tax system by choosing a zero capital
and a positive labour tax in the long-run. In other words, as said above, the
best long-run policy that the Ramsey government can implement to support
aggregate welfare is to increase labour productivity and income through tax-
induced increases in the capital stock. In stark contrast, time-consistent
Markov policy suggests that it is optimal for the government to impose a very
high capital tax and to subsidise labour. Given that the tax system is more
ine¢ cient under lack of commitment, the optimal size of the government, G
c
t ,
is reduced relative to Ramsey policy, as are total output and welfare (both
at average and individual levels).
In contrast to Martin (2010), we nd that, for the same calibration used in
Klein et al. (2008), a conscatory capital tax does not follow in a capitalist-
worker setup. The incentive to tax capital heavily in a Markov-perfect equi-
librium and, at the same time, the incentive to subsidise labour, so as to
undo the damage from high capital taxes, are weaker in our model. Capital
taxation is more distortionary in an heterogeneous economy, since a subset
of the population does not hold capital, which means that ceteris paribus the
per capita capital is lower relative to an economy where all agents have cap-
ital holdings. Hence, the incentive to tax capital is weaker here. In turn, the
labour supply distortion, at aggregate level, caused by future capital taxation
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is smaller here relative to a single agent model (see Martin (2010)). This fol-
lows, rst because capital taxation is lower and second because the workers
optimal labour supply decision is not a¤ected negatively by future capital
taxation. Accordingly, the incentive for the government to subsidise labour
is also weaker.12 Therefore, it appears that heterogeneity and, in particular
heterogeneous marginal propensities to save and labour supply elasticities,
contribute to well-dened non-conscatory tax rates on capital. In fact, we
nd a robust range of interior solutions under heterogeneity based on changes
in our base calibration over empirically relevant parameter ranges.
One would expect aggregate welfare to be higher under Ramsey policies
and that the capitalist should be better o¤, given the more e¢ cient aggre-
gate economy and the zero capital tax. The results in Table 1 conrm that
this is indeed the case. But what about the worker? Does the increased
productivity resulting from higher capital accumulation under Ramsey pro-
vide enough compensation in terms of private consumption? As it turns
out, Table 1 suggests that consumption for the worker is roughly the same
under commitment and discretion. However, the increased e¢ ciency of the
tax system under commitment allows the government to provide much more
of the public good and this makes the worker better o¤ overall. Therefore,
comparing Ramsey to Markov, commitment is benecial to all agents.
5 Non-Benthamite (partisan) optimal policy
A striking result in Judds (1985) analysis, which also holds here, is that the
optimal allocations under commitment are independent of the weights,  and
(1 ), that the government employs in its objective function (22). This can
be easily explained by examining the optimality conditions under Ramsey
which we have not been presented to save space. However, in lieu of these,
Table 2 aptly illustrates the point. These results suggest that, for all agents,
the zero capital taxation policy is the best to adopt in a Ramsey setup and,
as a consequence, there is no conict of interests between agents.
12The inelastic supply of labour for the worker creates the incentive for the government
to positively tax this factor on e¢ ciency grounds. However, since the same tax rate also
applies to the labour supply of the capitalists, which is adversely a¤ected by high future
capital taxation, a labour tax would also have an adverse e¤ect on aggregate labour supply,
which is ine¢ ciently low because of high capital taxation and low capital stocks. Hence,
the incentive to subsidize labor. These opposing incentives, on balance, lead to a subsidy
for a Benthamite government.
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Table 2: Steady-state Ramsey
 = 0  = 0:7  = 1
tk 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
tl 0.3965 0.3965 0.3965
Ck 0.8964 0.8964 0.8964
Cw 0.7109 0.7109 0.7109
G
c
t 0.3819 0.3819 0.3819
lk 0.1174 0.1174 0.1174
lw 0.3000 0.3000 0.3000
U -0.8417 -0.8417 -0.8417
Uk -0.7005 -0.7005 -0.7005
Uw -0.9022 -0.9022 -0.9022
However, does this commonality of interests hold when we consider time-
consistent policy? Would agents be better o¤ if the government was partisan,
attaching a higher weight to a particular income group? Would both agents
prefer a Benthamite government? If not, how much partisan behaviour would
be optimal for aggregate welfare and for each agent? Does a conict of
interests between agents arise under time-consistent optimal policy?
5.1 "Capitalist bias"
To provide answers to these questions, we next solve the model and evaluate
welfare for a range of weights in the governments objective function. Figure
1 below plots the steady-state values for the policy instruments, output, cap-
ital, each of the arguments in the utility function, welfare for each agent and
aggregate welfare against the weight attached to workers, . What becomes
immediately apparent is that, in contrast to a commitment equilibrium, the
value of  matters for equilibrium allocations and welfare. The fact that,
for both types of agents, welfare is greater for  < nw, implies that caring
more for the capitalist relative to the benevolent case,  = nw, is Pareto
improving.
Starting from the Benthamite case for the base calibration,  = nw = 0:7,
lets rst examine optimal allocations as  increases, i.e. the government
cares more (less) for the worker (capitalist). Lack of commitment and par-
tisan preferences make high capital taxes unavoidable. The disincentive for
the capitalist to accumulate capital hurts total output and public goods pro-
vision. The combination of partisan preferences and adverse total e¤ects,
push the government to compensate workersincome by increasing the labour
subsidy. The more the government cares about the worker, the higher the
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incentive to subsidise labour. This, in turn, implies that the need to gen-
erate tax revenue, and thus to tax capital, will be even higher. Therefore,
the e¢ ciency distortions introduced by the tax system become higher and
higher as  rises. The outcome of all these changes is a fall in the welfare of
all agents. It is important to point out that this is true even for the worker.
The adverse income e¤ects from higher capital taxes exceed the increased in-
come generated by labour subsidies, so that workerss consumption falls for
 > 0:7. Not surprisingly, the capitalist is also directly hurt by capital taxes
that reduce his capital income. When the weight on the worker increases
above a critical point, i.e.  > 0:737 for this model/calibration, the incentive
for the government to impose conscatory capital taxes is so high that an
interior solution cannot be obtained.13
Lets next consider reductions in the weight for the worker. As  falls
from nw = 0:7, the incentive for the government to tax capital and subsidise
labour is initially reduced. Actually, labour subsidies turn quickly into taxes
as  decreases. For the opposite reasons from those explained above, all this
is initially good for total output, tax revenues and public goods provision. It
is also good for the welfare of both agents, even workers.
[Figure 1 here]
However, the above results do not hold for all reductions in . After
a point, a higher labour tax starts hurting the worker, given that it is his
only source of income, while a higher quantity of the public good provides
the same benet to all. Thus, as  decreases, the government redistributes
welfare towards the agent that it cares more about, namely, the capitalist
in this experiment. In addition, after a critical level, higher levels of public
spending are not consistent with further decreases in the capital tax. A
low capital tax policy will no longer be sustainable and capital taxes start
increasing again. In fact, given that the increase now takes place in a very
distorted economy, due to high labour taxes, it quickly leads to conscatory
capital taxation for  < 0:618:
The above discussion suggests that, up to a point, a "capitalist bias" on
the part of the government can provide a means to reduce the ine¢ ciently
high capital taxation inherent in a Markov-perfect equilibrium and so push
the economy toward its second-best, Ramsey outcome. This is similar to
the nding in the literature on time-consistent monetary policy, where a
13Note that in the model without labour income taxation analysed in Krusell (2002),
the capital taxes are not conscatory when the weight attached to the worker is arbitrarily
close to unity, but not equal to one. The introduction of labour taxation reduces the upper
bound on the policymakers partisan preferences that can be consistent with an interior
equilibrium.
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conservative central banker, who cares predominantly about ination, helps
to reduce the ination bias. However, although the "capitalist bias" can
be a substitute for commitment technology, it cannot eliminate the time-
inconsistency problem in scal policy since, as pointed out above, the need to
supply the public good eventually makes a low capital tax plan unsustainable.
Since a "capitalist bias" is Pareto improving, for a range of  < nw, it
seems worth exploiting in scal policy design. Over this range, the benets
accruing to the worker, from lower capital taxation, in addition to the higher
amount of the public good, more than compensates for the increases in labour
taxation. This is clearly the case for the capitalist as well, who, in addition,
benets directly from increased capital income. However, for neither of the
two agents is it preferable for the government to set  = 0. Actually, the wel-
fare of both agents falls after a critically low value of . Thus, the capitalist
in this model has an interest in the welfare of the worker. The reason is that
overtaxing labour, which hurts the worker, will eventually lead to increased
capital taxation, through the increased scal spending channel. There is,
thus, an optimal degree of "capitalist bias" for both agents, which we further
explore below.
It is nally interesting to note that a "capitalist bias" can help this model
to generate predictions regarding the tax rates that are consistent with some
empirical regularities, i.e. high, but non-conscatory capital taxes and posi-
tive labour taxes that are much lower than the capital taxes (see e.g. Garcia-
Mila et. al. (2010) for a discussion of tax rates in the US).
5.2 Conicting or common interests?
Under lack of commitment, Figure 1 showed that, up to a point, it was in
both agentsinterests for the government to favour capitalists, i.e.  < nw,
when designing optimal policy. However, a closer look at this Figure suggests
that their interests regarding the size of this bias are not perfectly aligned.
Table 3 focuses on the relevant range for  from Figure 1 to illustrate this
point more precisely. We can see, based on maximum welfare for each agent,
that the capitalist would prefer  = 0:629, while the worker would prefer
 = 0:637. These in turn imply non-trivial di¤erences for the preferred tax
structure by each agent. In particular, capital and labour tax rates of 76:8%
and 21:8% respectively would apply to the capitalist, and 77:1% and 15:9%
to the worker. These also imply di¤erences in the scal size, i.e. a G
c
t for the
capitalist that is about 12:2% higher than for the worker. Finally, changing
 from 0:637 to 0:629 implies welfare gains for the capitalist of around 1:5%
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and welfare losses for the worker of about 1:1%.14 Reductions of  below
0.629 make everybody worse o¤, even capitalists.
Table 3: Steady-state Markov
 tk tl G
c
t U Uk Uw
0.627 0.7684 0.2360 0.1140 -0.9191 -0.8626 -0.9527
0.629 0.7683 0.2180 0.1104 -0.9180 -0.8625 -0.9507
0.631 0.7685 0.2016 0.1070 -0.9175 -0.8629 -0.9494
0.633 0.7691 0.1864 0.1039 -0.9174 -0.8636 -0.9486
0.635 0.7700 0.1722 0.1010 -0.9176 -0.8646 -0.9481
0.637 0.7711 0.1590 0.0984 -0.9182 -0.8658 -0.9480
0.639 0.7723 0.1466 0.0958 -0.9189 -0.8673 -0.9481
These results suggest that there can be areas of both common and con-
icting interests. The former are for partisan preferences above and below
the bolded rows in Table 3, whereas the latter are those in between the bolded
rows. Conict of interests arises under discretion since the decrease in the
capital tax, as a result of the "capitalist bias", has additional benets for the
capitalist, compared to the worker, in the form of increased (after-tax) capi-
tal income. Thus, the capitalists welfare is maximised when the capital tax
is minimised. For the worker, the price he would pay, in terms of increased
labour taxes and lost welfare, to have the capital tax reduced below 77:1% is
too high. These ndings further imply that, in the area of opposing interests,
there is a trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. In particular, decreasing 
below 0:637 is initially good for e¢ ciency, since aggregate welfare increases
up to a maximum at  = 0:633. However, it is not good for equity, as the
welfare of the worker is reduced and thus the inequality between the worker
and the capitalist increases.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we solved for time-consistent (Markov-perfect) optimal scal
policy in an economy with capitalists and workers. By studying both e¢ -
ciency and distributional issues, we lled a gap in the related literature that
has, with the exception of Krusell (2002), addressed time-consistent policy
in models with a representative agent.
14These gains and losses refer to the compensating consumption supplement calculated
as 11 ln

Uah
Ubh

, where a and b are the welfare levels preferred by the workers and capitalists
respectively; and, as dened above, h = k;w denotes the two agents.
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Heterogeneity allowed us to obtain interior and robust Markov-perfect
solutions for the capital tax rate relative to single agent models. We showed
that, for standard calibrations, the socially optimal tax rate on capital is
neither zero (see e.g. Judd (1985)) nor conscatory (see Martin (2010))
in the long-run. We also showed that the labour subsidy can turn into a
labour tax depending on governments preferences. Thus, there is room for
redistribution.
Our results provide some lessons that are useful for policy makers. A
"capitalist bias" on the part of the government can work as an imperfect
substitute for the lack of commitment, thereby pushing the economy from
its third-best (Markov) in the direction of its second-best (Ramsey). This
"capitalist bias", up to a point, can benet both capitalists and workers.
Thus, there is an area of common interest, in the sense that the worker has
an interest in the welfare of the capitalist, and vice versa. However, the
optimal degree of "capitalist bias" di¤ers between workers and capitalists.
Naturally, the capitalist would choose a higher degree than the worker. Be-
tween these, there is an area of conicting interests that implies a trade-o¤
between e¢ ciency and equity.
In generating our ndings, we contributed to the related literature on
optimal scal policy in several ways. First, we expand that branch of the
literature that has studied Ramsey policy with heterogeneous agents (e.g.
Judd (1985), Lansing (1999) and Greulich and Marcet (2008)) by solving for
time-consistent policy. Second, we extend the literature on time-consistent
policy with a representative agent (e.g. Ortigueira (2006), Klein et al. (2008)
and Martin (2010)) by adding heterogeneity and distributional implications.
Third, we add to Krusell (2002), Ortigueira (2006) and Klein et al. (2008),
who have assumed that the government chooses only one tax instrument at
a time, by choosing both capital and labour taxes simultaneously.
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7 Appendix
In this appendix, we use the log-linear utility function (33) and the Cobb-
Douglas production function (34) into the more general model presented in
the main body of the paper. We specify what changes in each step of the
solution.
7.1 Decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE)
Equations (13)-(19) become respectively:
1
Ck;t
=
(1 +Rt+1)
Ck;t+1
(35)
2
(1  lk;t) =
1Wt
Ck;t
(36)
2
(1  lw;t) =
1Wt
Cw;t
(37)
Cw;t = Wtlw;t (38)
nkYf;t = n
kCk;t + n
wCw;t + n
k[Kk;t+1   (1  )Kk;t] +Gct (39)
G
c
t = n
kYf;t   nkKk;t  RtnkKk;t  Wt(nklk;t + nwlw;t) (40)
Yf;t =
A

nkKk;t
 
nklk;t + n
wlw;t
1 
nk
: (41)
Since (36) implies lk;t = 1  2Ck;t1Wt and (37)  (38) imply lw;t =
1
1+2
and
Cw;t =
1Wt
1+2
, equations (20) and (21) become respectively:
Ck;t =
1
(1 + 2
1
)
[ Kk;t+1 + (1 +Rt)Kk;t +Wt]
 C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1) (42)
and
G
c
t = n
kYf;t   nkKk;t  RtnkKk;t  Wtnk[1  2Ck;t
1Wt
] 
 Wtnw 1
(1 + 2)
 G(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1) (43)
where the latter follows by using (42) for Ck;t:
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7.2 Response of private agents
In this special case, since lk;t = 1   2Ck;t1Wt and lw;t =
1
1+2
; we need to
specify only one response function, Kk;t+1 = H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt): To do so, we
work as in Klein et al. (2008). In particular, using (42), we have from the
Euler-equation of capitalists in (35):
(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1)  1
C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1)
 
  (1 + 	(Kk;t+1))
C(Kk;t+1;(Kk;t+1);	(Kk;t+1); h(Kk;t+1))
= 0 (44)
which conrms that, if there is a solution, this is of the form Kk;t+1 
H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt). We next specify the properties of this response function
H(:):
First, using H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt) for Kk;t+1, we have:
(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt)) = 0 (45)
so that at the optimum:
k(t) + k0 (t)Hk(t) = 0 or Hk(t) =
 k(t)
k0 (t)
(46)
w(t) + k0 (t)Hw(t) = 0 or Hw(t) =
 w(t)
k0 (t)
(47)
r(t) + k0 (t)Hr(t) = 0 or Hr(t) =
 r(t)
k0 (t)
(48)
where k(t), w(t), r(t) and k0 (t) denote the partials of (Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1)
and Hk(t), Hw(t) and Hr(t) denote the partials of H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt):
Second, we also have, for given Kk;t+1:
(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1)  1
C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt; Kk;t+1)
 
  (1 + 	(Kk;t+1))
C(Kk;t+1;(Kk;t+1);	(Kk;t+1); h(Kk;t+1))
= 0 (49)
so that we get:
k(t) =  
1
(Ck;t)2
Ck(t) (50)
w(t) =  
1
(Ck;t)2
Cw(t) (51)
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r(t) =  
1
(Ck;t)2
Cr(t) (52)
k0 (t) =  
1
(Ck;t)2
Ck0 (t) 

Ck;t+1
	k(Kk;t+1) +
(1 + 	(Kk;t+1))
[Ck;t+1]2

fCk(t+ 1) + Cw(t+ 1)k(Kk;t+1) + Cr(t+ 1)	k(Kk;t+1) +
+Ck0 (t+ 1)hk(Kk;t+1)g (53)
where Ck(t), Cw(t), Cr(t) and Ck0 (t) denote the partials of C(Kk;t;Wt; Rt;
Kk;t+1) as dened above. This completes the properties of the private re-
sponse function, Kk;t+1  H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt).
7.3 Dynamic programming problem of the government
The government solves the problem specied in subsection 3.2. The con-
straints in (23)-(29) are now simplied to:
Ck;t =
1
(1 + 2
1
)
[ Kk;t+1 + (1 +Rt)Kk;t +Wt] (54)
lk;t = 1  2Ck;t
1Wt
(55)
Kk;t+1 = H(Kk;t;Wt; Rt) (56)
Cw;t =
1Wt
1 + 2
(57)
lw;t =
1
1 + 2
(58)
G
c
t = n
kYf;t   nkKk;t  RtnkKk;t  Wt(nklk;t + nwlw;t) (59)
where
Yf;t =
A

nkKk;t
 
nklk;t + n
wlw;t
1 
nk
: (60)
7.4 Markov-perfect equilibrium
The nal system is now reduced to three equations, namely, the governments
GEE, the governments optimality condition for Rt in (31) and the Euler
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condition of capitalists in (35). These three equations in three functional
equations,Kk;t+1 = h(Kk;t),Wt = (Kk;t) andRt = 	(Kk;t) are respectively:
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
= (1  )[ @uk;t+1
@Ck;t+1
@Ck;t+1
@Kk;t+1
  @uk;t+1
@(1  lk;t+1)
@lk;t+1
@Kk;t+1
+
@uk;t+1
@G
c
t+1
@G
c
t+1
@Kk;t+1
] + [
@uw;t+1
@Cw;t+1
@Cw;t+1
@Kk;t+1
  @uw;t+1
@(1  lw;t+1)
@lw;t+1
@Kk;t+1
+
+
@uw;t+1
@G
c
t+1
@G
c
t+1
@Kk;t+1
] + 
dVt+2
dKk;t+2
Hk(t+ 1) (61)
(1  )
"
@uk;t
@Ck;t
@Ck;t
@Rt
  @uk;t
@(1  lk;t)
@lk;t
@Rt
+
@uk;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Rt
#
+ [
@uw;t
@Cw;t
@Cw;t
@Rt
 
  @uw;t
@(1  lw;t)
@lw;t
@Rt
+
@uw;t
@G
c
t
@G
c
t
@Rt
] + 
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
Hr(t) = 0 (62)
1
Ck;t
=
(1 +Rt+1)
Ck;t+1
(63)
where Ck;t, lk;t, Kk;t+1, Cw;t, lw;t, G
c
t and Yf;t have been specied above and
dVt+1
dKk;t+1
follows from the optimality condition forWt. Similarly,
dVt+2
dKk;t+2
follows
from the same condition led once also written in subsection 3.2.
7.5 Solution algorithm
To solve the system of functional equations in (61)-(63) for the steady-state,
we follow the perturbation method proposed by Krusell et al. (2002) and
Klein et. al. (2008). In particular, we approximate the unknown func-
tions, Kk;t+1 = h(Kk;t), Wt = (Kk;t) and Rt = 	(Kk;t) in equilibrium by
polynomials of some degree n and then iterate on n until the steady-state
values for the endogenous variables do not change. When n = 0, the system
in (61)-(63) can be solved for the three unknown constant-guess functions.
For higher order approximations, this system also contains derivatives of the
guessed policy functions and thus has more unknowns than equations. The
methodology employed circumvents this problem by augmenting (61)-(63)
to include the nth derivatives of (61)-(63) with respect to K, evaluated at
the steady-state. All results reported in the paper are based on cubic poly-
nomials, as this was su¢ cient to guarantee convergence of the endogenous
variables at the steady-state.
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Figure 1: Partisan preferences
Benthamite preferences: =nw=0.7
